ABSTRACT

Company owners are responsible for monitoring and making policies, including tax avoidance policies. This study aims to establish empirical evidence on the effect of ownership identities such as family ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and government ownership on tax avoidance practices. The purposive sampling method was employed from datasets covering non-financial firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2018-2021 leaving a total sample of 352 companies for the samples. Findings indicate that high family ownership in civil law jurisdictions encourages tax avoidance. Meanwhile, tax avoidance tendencies are reduced because institutional owners’ breadth of knowledge and access to information prevents them from acting impulsively. Managerial ownership makes managers both agents and principles, thus suppressing short-term opportunistic desires, including tax avoidance practices. Lastly, no evidence that government ownership significantly affects tax avoidance practices.

Keywords: ownership identity, family, institutional, managerial, and tax avoidance

INTRODUCTION

Tax is a legally required contribution to the state, with no direct reward required for individuals or entities following the respective taxation law. This definition is in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 28 of 2007 Concerning the Third Amendment of Law Number 6 of 1983 Regarding General Provisions and Procedures for Taxation Article 1. Taxes are spent for state purposes to improve public welfare (Arsanti, Fatchan & Fauzan, 2021). Thus, the nature of the benefits received by the taxpayer is indirect, even though the contribution is imperative. Given these definitions and the nature of indirect tax benefits, it is a challenge to the opportunistic nature of the individual taxpayer, let alone the corporate taxpayer.

When it comes to the implementation of taxes, the government as the tax administrator, and the taxpayer have their own perspectives and interests. The government needs to maximize its
collection from taxpayers because it sees taxes as a potential source of government revenue (Pratiwi, 2018). Meanwhile, taxpayers perceive tax payments as an additional burden, a deduction from income, and a reduction of net profit. This leads to an opportunistic attitude of taxpayers to minimize the amount of tax payable (Merslythalia & Lasmana, 2017).

Curiously, both parties' different perspectives use tax regulations as tools to achieve goals based on their perspectives. To regulate all possible tax withdrawals, the government creates tax regulations. Taxpayers, on the other hand, are taking advantage of tax law loopholes to reduce their tax liability. This practice of tax avoidance is a dilemma for the government since it's legal but unethical action.

A relatively low level of tax compliance is an early indicator of tax avoidance (Gazali et al., 2020). Sembiring (2021) revealed that between 2015 and 2020, Indonesia's tax compliance rate is only 78% per year. This means that there are no less than five million non-compliant taxpayers. Given the large number of cases of tax avoidance and its impact on a country's revenue, tax avoidance is still an urgent issue, especially in Indonesia.

The tax ratio indicates how much the government is able to collect in taxes from economic activities that occur in the country (Lestari, P. A. S., Pratomo, D., & Asalam, A. G., 2019). Dihi (2022) stated that Indonesia had a tax ratio of only 9.11% in 2021. It’s a low ratio compared to the average tax ratio of other Asia-Pacific countries, where they recorded an average of 19%. Wildan (2021) stated that Indonesia's tax ratio ranks third lowest out of 24 countries in Asia Pacific and is lower than the tax ratio of 30 countries in Africa. This is an indication that Indonesia's tax collection capacity is low, so the factors that can have a bearing on this need to be examined.

The percentage of share ownership affects the amount of control over business activities, so the composition of share ownership needs to be considered. This heterogeneity in the composition of share ownership is called the ownership structure (Manurung & Kusumah, 2016; Neneng & Mahardini, 2022). With the difference in the number of shares owned by each party, the terms majority shareholders and minority shareholders appear. Majority shareholders in a company have greater rights and opportunities to control the company and can increase supervision and control over company management (Pratomo & Nuraulia, 2021). The greater the share ownership, the greater the portion of its role to supervise the company's operational activities (Neneng & Mahardini, 2022).

The supervisory power of interested parties, such as shareholders, is a critical factor in tax avoidance practices since they are carried out by management through decisions from its stakeholders (Merslythalia & Lasmana, 2017). This causes the possibility of corporate ownership identity to affect corporate taxation practices. Differences in the type of share ownership in a company will lead to a share ownership identity (Singal & Putra, 2019).

Previous research on ownership identity and tax avoidance has been conducted several times and has inconsistent results. Gaaya, Lakhal & Lakhal (2017) found that in Tunisia, given government pressure after the revolution, family ownership results in a significant positive impact on tax avoidance. In contrast, Maharani & Juliarto (2019) concluded that tax avoidance will not be affected by family ownership, because it would influence their image as shareholders. Furthermore, the study concluded that the family must be trustworthy enough for outside investors to invest in the firm.

Aside from family ownership, prior studies on institutional ownership are also inconclusive. Nurmawan & Nuritomo (2022) discovered that institutional ownership will encourage tax avoidance practices. Institutional owners’ expectation of optimal returns leads them to seek the lowest possible tax burden. In contrast, Pratiwi (2018) and Rakayana, Sudarma & Rosidi (2021) found that institutional
ownership does not lead to tax avoidance, as it increases the control of corporate management.

In another area of ownership, Krisna (2019) explained that managerial ownership makes managers act as agents as well as principals, so it should have no impact on tax avoidance. Meanwhile, several studies have found that higher managerial ownership leads to lower tax avoidance because managers act as dual agents (Alkurdi & Mardini, 2020); (Arsanti et al., 2021). Prior research related to government ownership and tax avoidance was done by Nabilah, Kartiko & Rachmi et al. (2022), and found a negative effect because taxes are regulated by the government. Conversely, due to the possibility of investors’ opportunistic nature with knowledge of tax regulations, research by Rakayana et al. (2021) found that tax avoidance is triggered by government ownership. These studies have varied results due to differences in the sectors used and in the years of research. Therefore, this study seeks to minimize the existing gap by using all company sectors on the IDX, except for the financial sector, using the latest sample year of 2018-2021.

Previous research has produced varied results due to differences in the sectors used and in the years of research. Therefore, this study seeks to minimize the existing gap by using all company sectors on the IDX, except for the financial sector, using the latest sample year 2018-2021, and using ownership identities that represent various types, such as individuals represented by family ownership, external parties represented by institutional ownership, internal firms represented by managerial ownership, and policymakers represented by government ownership.

The lack of empirical evidence on the impact of ownership identity on tax avoidance, especially in Indonesia, has encouraged this study to carry out further research. This research aims to explain the effect of ownership identity (family, institutional, managerial, and government) on tax avoidance in Indonesian non-financial companies listed on IDX Indonesia. It was chosen because of the revealing data on tax avoidance practices described above. The ownership identity proxies that will be used are family, institutional, managerial, and government ownership. These proxies are considered to represent the majority shareholders in Indonesia. With the different characteristics of share ownership, each owner has different objectives, power, and control over management, including control over the tax management of a company. Furthermore, due to the different resources, incentives, and concentration of shareholders that form the ownership structure of a company, the ownership identity should impact tax avoidance (Saleh, Zahirdin & Octaviani, 2017).

The paper is organized as follows. After the introduction sections, the literature review and hypothesis development will be shown. The next section will review the research method, followed by the analysis and discussion method. Then the conclusion section will be followed by the limitation and suggestion section.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Agency Theory

The agency's theory describes the relationship between principal shareholders and agent managers, which is prone to conflict because they have different interests. Shareholders are delegating their powers to managers as agents, to make decisions and perform business operations as principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To carry out their activities, shareholders as principals delegate their powers to managers as agents that are obligated to carry out the shareholders’ mandate to obtain maximum profits and increase shareholder value (Masripah, Vera & Fitriasari, 2015; Inger & Vansant, 2018).

The agency problems that potentially arise in this study are between the managers of the company as agents and the shareholders as principals (Bauer, Kourouxous & Krenn, 2018). There are two different interests between the managers
Does Ownership Structure Affect Tax Avoidance? (Arifin, Nurrahmawati and Perwitasari)

and the shareholders regarding the direction of the company’s business, which can cause conflicts between the two parties (Bauer et al., 2018). The distribution of shareholdings or the number of shares held by shareholders can be used to establish any possible conflict of interest between agencies (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In this study, agency theory is used to assess the effect of different ownership perspectives on tax avoidance.

**Tax Avoidance**

Tax avoidance refers to the reduction of tax obligations by utilizing tax planning strategies that tend to reduce the tax liability of the company (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Tax avoidance involves a series of measures and governance practices aimed at reducing tax due by exploiting loopholes and weaknesses in the applicable taxation legislation (Santoso, 2014). The scheme of a series of transactions by paying attention to the weaknesses in the tax regulations in a country is an action called tax avoidance (Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2008; Lanis & Richardson, 2013; Krisna, 2019; Putri & Lawita, 2019; Pratiwi & Kusumaningsih, 2020). Usually, companies blend tax avoidance activities through complex accounting schemes that are massive, varied, and systematically designed (Krisna, 2019).

Annuar, Salihu & Obid (2014) explain that tax avoidance has an impact on increasing profits and saving companies cash from the tax liabilities to be paid. The company's value and dividends will be increased by these savings. Therefore, tax avoidance cannot be said to be an ethical act because large companies can pay less tax than they should compared to small companies.

**Family Ownership**

Family ownership refers to all individual shareholders or multiple individuals or firms whose ownership is recorded in the same family or close family firms that are not owned by the public, the state, or other institutions (Hidayanti & Laksito, 2013). The benefits and costs of tax avoidance are affected by the agency's conflict in family ownership since this ownership is considered to have a relatively low diversification policy, a high concentration of ownership, better long-term objectives, and a good reputation compared to other ownership identities. (Andres, 2008; Chen, Chen, Cheng & Shevlin, 2010; Handayani & Ibrani, 2019).

Chen et al. (2010), Steijvers & Niskanen (2014), and Ibrahim et al. (2021) stated that family owners acted less opportunistically and tended to avoid risky activities such as tax evasion practices due to their knowledge of the potential penalties or fines that would be faced if they were caught committing fraud and for the sake of maintaining the reputation and good name of the extended family and the name of the company. Thus, we may conclude the following hypothesis:

**H1:** Family ownership has a significant negative effect on tax avoidance

**Institutional Ownership**

The number of company shares held by institutions or elsewhere is considered institutional ownership (Sugiarto, 2009). Institutional owners have a significant number of shares that are considered to have large voting rights and the ability to provide effective supervision and force management to reduce opportunistic attitudes in the interest of the company (Charisma & Dwimulyani, 2019; Kusumawati & Setiawan, 2019). Institutions are parties that are assumed to understand the company's operations because they are used to managing their institutions.

According to the agency theory perspective, managers tend to fulfill their personal interests first instead of considering the welfare of the company and the interests of shareholders. Thus, institutional shareholders have more effective monitoring and control opportunities than other types of ownership. Therefore, with more effective control from institutional parties, it can affect the size of the potential for management to engage in or avoid tax avoidance practices Subagiastra, Arizona & Mahaputra (2017), Arsanti et al. (2021), and
Dakhli (2022) state that given increased monitoring from institutions that can understand the efficiency of a firm's operation, an increasing number of institutional shareholders leads to better business performance. Therefore, the second hypothesis is concluded as stated below:

H2: Institutional ownership has a significant negative effect on tax avoidance

Managerial Ownership
Managerial ownership occurs when managers are involved in the shareholder structure of a company, implying that the manager is not only an agent but also a principal of the company (Sugiarto, 2009). This means that in addition to being agents, the managers may also be principals or shareholders of the firm. Larger ownership makes managers more opportunistic and has the same goals and interests as other shareholders, which is maximizing bonuses and dividends (Alzoubi, 2016). The good side of having managers as shareholders is that agency conflicts with other shareholders can be suppressed (Kusumawati & Setiawan, 2019). However, the negative effects include low monitoring and control from minority shareholders, so from the perspective of agency theory, managers will only conflict with the company's minority shareholders, managers with low monitoring from shareholders will have high opportunism.

Research by Putri & Lawita (2019), Alkurdi & Mardini (2020), and Arsanti et al. (2021) states that the potential for fraud in the firm's activities will be reduced by managers as shareholders. This is because managerial shareholders tend to be concerned about the sustainability of their firm and therefore do not want their firm to get into trouble with tax problems. In addition, managers who act as agents and principals will have greater potential losses if they are found to be committing fraud by the relevant tax supervisory authority. Managers will lose, as will both management and the firm's shareholders. Thus, the third hypothesis will be concluded as below:

H3: Managerial ownership has a significant negative effect on tax avoidance

Government Ownership
The condition under which the government owns a share in a company is defined as government ownership (Munisi, Hermes & Randøy, 2014). Government ownership has various purposes, one of which is as a form of social welfare maximization and an effort to avoid potential monopolies by public firms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Government ownership also aims to ensure that prices reflect social margins so that firms charge fair prices in their operations. Government ownership through agency theory does not necessarily eliminate the opportunistic possibility of controlling shareholders. Firms with government ownership have the opportunity to pay a lower tax burden. The reason is that the connections of government shareholders to the tax collecting authorities will certainly be better, so that tax management can be carried out better than in other public companies that do not have government shareholders.

Putra & Suhardianto (2020) state that the existence of political connections through government ownership will not make companies tend to cheat on taxes. On the contrary, government ownership is expected to be an additional supervisor of effective management because the government is considered to have good knowledge of tax laws. In addition, government ownership will tend to be under public supervision so that it will provide more information for stakeholders (Honggowati, Rahmawati, Aryani & Probohudono, 2019). Based on the description above, the next hypothesis can be drawn as below:

H4: Government ownership has a significant negative effect on tax avoidance

RESEARCH METHODS
Population and Sample
Non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period 2018-2021 is the population covered in this study. As stated before,
Indonesia was chosen as the population because the tax ratio in Indonesia is the third lowest among 24 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, indicating that tax avoidance practices are relatively high here. In addition, Indonesia has the unique character of being a civil law country. Meanwhile, the selected year is used to take account of time before and after a Covid-19 pandemic. The purposive sampling method was employed according to criteria laid down based on previous research, such as the research of Azizah & Kusmiyanto (2016), Subagiastra et al. (2017), Alfiyah, Subroto & Ghofar (2022), as follows: 1) Companies in the non-financial sector listed on the IDX in the period 2018-2021. 2) Companies that published financial reports during the period 2018-2021. 3) The company did not record losses or had negative profits in the 2018-2021 period.

Secondary information derived from a public company's financial statements is used in this research. As shown in Table 1, the determination of the sample selected using the purposive sampling method is given below.

This study is observed over 4 years, 2018-2021. There are 698 non-financial companies sector listed on the IDX in the observation year, with a total of 2776 observation data. This number has been reduced by 234 samples because they present incomplete financial reports. In addition, 61 companies and the remaining 565 observation data posted losses or negative earnings results during the study year, so they could not be sampled. Finally, 51 outliers were also excluded, leaving a total sample of 352 companies with 1139 observations and having unbalanced data nature. It means that the cross-sectional and time-series units have unequal amounts of observation data.

**Tax Avoidance**
To measure tax avoidance, a Book Tax Difference (BTD) proxy is used by identify permanent differences between accounting and tax principles that may indicate tax avoidance (Saragih, Raya & Hendrawan et al., 2021). BTD describes differences in accounting between tax and financial statements as a consequence of the different accounting standards and taxation rules (Jati & Murwaningsari, 2020). As a result, the company’s estimates of pretax income and taxable income are different. The calculation of a firm's profit and loss may be affected by these differences (Hidayat & Mulda, 2019).

BTD is often used in research regarding tax avoidance by Lietz (2013), Jati & Murwaningsari (2020), and Saragih et al. (2021). Firms have the opportunity to increase their book income to show investors that their economic performance is strong. On the other hand, companies need to manage taxable income reports to reduce their tax burden. This can be seen through the BTD proxy, which can indicate tax avoidance. BTD is calculated by subtracting pre-tax income from taxable income divided by total assets (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Kholbadalov, 2012).

**Family Ownership**
The concept of family ownership has been established by Subagiastra et al. (2017) as shareholders in a company with their names or their families’ group names. The percentage of shares held by those with a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampling Criteria</th>
<th>Sampel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Companies from the non-financial sector listed on the IDX in 2018-2021</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies that do not present financial reports and have incomplete financial reports</td>
<td>(234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies that recorded negative profits or experienced losses</td>
<td>(61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outlier data</td>
<td>(51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total firm used</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total observation data</td>
<td>1139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
common family name shall be taken into account for determining the ownership of families (Gaaya et al., 2017). The number of family members shall be used to measure the percentage of ownership, divided by the shares held (Rakayana et al., 2021).

**Institutional Ownership**
The percentage of shares in a firm that are owned by non-person entities such as organizations and institutions is called institutional ownership (Sugiarto, 2009). The percentage of the shares held by institutional investors shall be used to measure this variable (Saleh et al., 2017; Hohmann, 2021). The number of shares owned by the institution divided by the total number of outstanding shares of the company shall be measured as a percentage of institutional shareholders (Kusumawati & Setiawan, 2019; Rakayana et al., 2021).

**Managerial Ownership**
The management’s holding of company shares shall be regarded as managerial ownership. The percentage of shares that are owned by managers who have an interest in company management can be used to measure this variable. The management’s holding of company shares shall be regarded as managerial ownership. A percentage of the shares owned by managers who are in charge of a company can be used to measure this variable (Saleh et al., 2017). The total amount of shares held by management divided by the total number of company shares shall be measured as the manager’s ownership (Kusumawati & Setiawan, 2019; Rakayana et al., 2021).

**Government Ownership**
The proportion of the company’s shares owned by the state is called government ownership (Munisi et al., 2014). Divide the total shares held by the government by the total shares outstanding to measure this variable (Rakayana et al., 2021).

**Control Variables**

**Profitability**
A company’s ability to generate profit during a normal period is called profitability (Putriningsih, Suyono & Herwiyanti, 2019; Sugiyanto, Trisnowati & Kusumawati, 2021). Profitability is assumed to affect tax avoidance practices because the basis for calculating and collecting the corporation tax due is the amount of profit that a company generates. (Sunarto, Widiyanto & Oktavian, 2021). Profitability can be measured by various ratios, such as return on assets (ROA) (Laksni & Narsa, 2021).

**Leverage**
The debt source financing of a firm’s business is called leverage. Debt leads to expenses that may reduce the tax burden (Pangaribuan, Hb, Agoes, Sihombing & Sunarsi, 2019). The leverage ratio shows that the company is burdened by substantial debt to fund its activities. Higher debt means a higher interest rate on that debt, which can automatically reduce the company’s tax burden (Fauzan, Ayu & Nurharjanti, 2019). The debt-to-asset ratio (DAR) is a proxy for measuring leverage, i.e., the sum of debt divided by the company’s overall assets (Suyono, 2018; Laksni & Narsa, 2021).

**Firm Size**
A scale that indicates the size of the firm is called firm size (Sugiyanto et al., 2021; Zamzamin, 2021). Normally, a larger firm size indicates a large amount of funding. Large funding encourages the expectation of a large return from that firm. The expectation of this large return encourages the attitude of obtaining maximum and sustainable profits, including by engaging in tax avoidance (Dewinta & Setiawan, 2016). A commonly used proxy to calculate firm size is to use the logarithm natural of total assets to avoid extreme fluctuations that bias the data (Laksni & Narsa, 2021).

**Capital Intensity**
A company’s capital intensity is determined by its decision to carry out financial expenses on operations and the financing of its assets to earn profits (Mustika, Ratnawati & Silfi, 2017). Capital intensities have an impact on asset
depreciation levels in the company. Large capital lead to a high level of the company’s depreciation expense (Dwiyanti & Jati, 2019). A large depreciation expense shrinks the company’s profit, so the amount of corporate income tax becomes smaller. The proportion of net fixed assets divided by total company assets is used to measure the level of capital intensity (Laksmi & Narsa, 2021).

**Covid-19**
The measurement of Covid-19, which is an economic time series, is done by adjustment or what is commonly referred to as deseasonalization or seasonal adjustment. Gujarati (1995), States that deseasonalization shall be measured using a dummy measure, namely number 1 if the year is infected with Covid-19 pandemic and 0 when the year is not affected by this disease.

**Data Analysis Method**
Because it involves several independent variables and one dependent variable, this study is based on Quantitative Methods with Multiple Linear Regression Analysis methods. The sequence of testing is to collect the relevant information and carry out data analysis tests based on characterization statistics, classical assumptions, and hypotheses. For hypothesis testing with multiple linear regression, we use the model set out below:

\[
BTD_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Fam_{it} + \beta_2 Inst_{it} + \beta_3 Man_{it} + \beta_4 Gov_{it} + \beta_5 Prof_{it} + \beta_6 Leve_{it} + \beta_7 Size_{it} + \beta_8 Cap_{it} + \beta_9 Cov_{it} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

Notes: BTD: Book Tax Difference; \(\alpha\): Constant, \(\beta\): Regression Coefficient; Fam: Family Ownership; Ins: Institutional Ownership; Man: Managerial Ownership; Gov: Government Ownership; Prof: Profitability; Lev: Leverage; Size: Firm Size; Cap: Capital Intensity; Cov: Covid-19; and \(\epsilon\) Error value

**ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION**
Based on Table 2, the N-value or the total number of research observations is 1139. BTD as a proxy for tax avoidance has an average value of 0.078 or 7.8%.

**Selection of Estimation Model**
The results of the Chow test analysis of the research data use the results of the cross-sectional chi-square test, which has a probability value of 0.000. The test results show a value smaller than the \(\alpha\) value or 0.05, which means that the analysis model selected by the Chow test is the fixed effect model. Similarly, the Hausman test shows a result that is smaller than the value of \(\alpha\) or 0.05, which means that the recommended estimation model to use based on the Hausman test is the fixed effect model.

**Table 2.**
Descriptive Statistic Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Book tax difference</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family ownership</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td>51.894</td>
<td>32.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional ownership</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td>65.703</td>
<td>22.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial ownership</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td>4.982</td>
<td>11.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government ownership</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>80.664</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>3.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profitability</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.228</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Size</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>23.650</td>
<td>33.537</td>
<td>28.684</td>
<td>1.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital intensity</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covid-19</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td>0.499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on the two test analysis results that have been conducted, the appropriate estimation model to be used in this study is the fixed effect model estimation.

Classical Assumption Test
The results of the multicollinearity test analysis for the independent variables in this study used the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis. Through this analysis, it can be stated that the variables of family ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and government ownership are free from multicollinearity symptoms with a VIF value of less than 10.0, namely 1.17; 1.32; 1.29; and 1.00, respectively.

The study used the results of the heteroscedasticity test analysis with the arch test model. If the probability value is greater than 0.05, the regression model is considered not to be constrained by heteroscedasticity symptoms. Through this analysis, the chi-square probability result is 0.50, which means that the data in the regression model of this study have no heteroscedasticity symptoms.

The normality test was not conducted because the number of research samples was more than 100 and it was considered that the sampling error term distribution was close to normal, so there was no need for a normality test (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Ajija, Sari, Setianto & Primati, 2011). Then the autocorrelation test also does not need to be done because the autocorrelation test has the aim of seeing the correlation of observational data sorted by space or time, which is appropriate for use in time series data (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Ajija et al., 2011).

Hypothesis Testing

Coefficient of determination test (R2) and simultaneous regression test (F)
Based on Table 3 below, regarding the results of the coefficient of determination (R2) test, it can be seen that the R-squared value is 0.769. According to Ghozali (2021), a value close to 1 means that the independent variables and control variables in the study are considered to be able to provide almost all the information needed to predict variations in the dependent variable. The independent variables in this study are able to explain 76.9% of the dependent variable, tax avoidance. While the rest cannot be explained by the variables in this study or can be explained by other variables outside the research model.

Table 3 shows the results of the simultaneous regression test analysis (F), where the result of the probability value (F-
statistic) is 0.0000. This value is less than α or 0.05. Therefore, it can be said that all variables, both independent and control, in this study simultaneously affect the dependent variable, which is tax avoidance.

Table 3 above shows us that the partial regression test results (t) for the family ownership variable has a probability level of 0.008 where the probability value is less than 0.05, so the family ownership variable has a significant influence on tax avoidance. The second variable is institutional ownership, where the probability value is 0.794 which means that there is no significant influence between institutional ownership and tax avoidance. The manager ownership variable also has no significant influence on tax avoidance because it has a value of 0.312. The last independent variable is government ownership, which has a significant value of 0.538 which means that the government ownership variable has no significant effect on tax avoidance. The control variables in the study, namely profitability and leverage, have a probability value of 0.000 and 0.000, so the profitability and leverage variables are significant for tax avoidance. Meanwhile, the variables of firm size, capital intensity, and Covid-19 have probability values of 0.095, 0.067, and 0.214, respectively, which means that these variables have no significant effect on tax avoidance.

Effect of Family Ownership on Tax Avoidance
The probability level of the family ownership variable is 0.00 or less than 0.05 with a negative coefficient value of 0.00. This means that the family ownership variable has a significant negative effect on tax avoidance. In conclusion, the higher the family ownership, the smaller the tax avoidance practices in the firm, so H1 is accepted.

Firms with family ownership tend not to be aggressive in avoiding taxes, because they will be more careful in avoiding risks that can damage the family name, the reputation, and the image of the company (Chen et al., 2010; Putri, 2015)

Hidayati & Diyanty (2018) argue that companies with family characteristics have long-term issues, which means that the firms and all the investments can be passed on to the next generation. Therefore, family ownership will try to increase the value of their wealth and reduce any possible long-term risks that can be a threat, including not doing tax avoidance. The findings of this study support the findings from Chen et al. (2010), Putri (2015), and Hidayati & Diyanty (2018).

Effect of Institutional Ownership on Tax Avoidance
The institutional ownership variable has a probability value of 0.79 or higher than 5% with a positive coefficient value of 0.00. This means that institutional ownership has no significant relationship with BTD, so H2 cannot be proven.

Institutional ownership has strong resources to obtain information about the benefits and losses that can arise from every decision (Mappadang, 2021). Therefore, they want to focus on company performance and earnings management rather than taking risks or profits from tax avoidance actions, so that their presence does not affect tax avoidance (Pratiwi, 2018).

Firms with institutional ownership characteristics have more effective and efficient oversight of the company’s business operations (Dakhli, 2022). However, this control does not guarantee that institutional shareholders can influence tax avoidance. Ashari et al. (2020) argue that the control of the company’s operational activities, in general, is carried out by the management, so institutional ownership will find it difficult to participate in deciding company policies. This research supports the findings of Dewi & Jati (2014), Wijayanti & Merkusiwati (2017), Pratiwi (2018), and Munawaroh & Sari (2019).

Effect of Managerial Ownership on Tax Avoidance
Managerial ownership shows a coefficient value of -0.04 with a probability value of 0.31, so it can be interpreted that the
presence of managerial shareholders has no significant effect on the BTD proxy, so H3 cannot be proven.

Managerial ownership is considered unable to influence tax avoidance due to its relatively small proportion of 4.9%. Rahayu et al. (2020) argue that the small number of managerial ownership cannot affect tax avoidance, they do not have enough power to take advantage of tax avoidance opportunities to gain large profits.

In addition, managerial shareholders have two functions at the same time, namely agent and principal. This fact can help managers control themselves from seeking personal benefits as managers because it will affect the value of the shares they own if the confidence of other investors decreases (Krisna, 2019). This research is consistent with the research of Maraya & Yendrawati (2016), Septiadi et al. (2017), and Purbowati (2021).

**Effect of Government Ownership on Tax Avoidance**

The government ownership variable has a probability value of 0.53 and a negative coefficient value of -0.00 on BTD. This means that there is no significant relationship between the government ownership variable and tax avoidance, so H4 cannot be proven. Possible explanations include that political connections to the firm through shareholders are not necessarily used to exploit these opportunities (Alfiyah et al., 2022). Managers may decide, based on the value of the firm's strategy to date, that there is no benefit in paying too much attention to the share of ownership in the firm.

In addition, the existence of government ownership in the company may encourage managers to be more vigilant with its tendency to commit tax avoidance, but not so much because it assumes that the government also expects a return on its investment (Efendi, Muawanah, Adi & Malang, 2022). Dharma & Ardiana (2016) explained that the strong reason for the lack of relationship between government shareholders and tax avoidance is that companies owned by local and central government parties are usually low-risk taxpayers. This is based on the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia Number 117 / PMK.03 / 2019 on Amendments to the Regulation of the Minister of Finance Number 39 / PMK.03 / 2018 on Procedures for Preliminary Refund of Excess Tax Payments. Through this regulation, it is stated that companies with political relations will be declared compliant taxpayers (Putra & Suhardianto, 2020). This study supports previous research by Alfiyah et al. (2022) and Efendi et al. (2022).

**Effect of Control Variables on Tax Avoidance**

The profitability variable has a coefficient of 0.51 and a probability value of 0.00. It means that profitability has a positive effect on tax avoidance, meaning that the higher the profitability, the higher the corporate tax avoidance. Darmawan & Sukartha (2014), stated that the positive influence was caused by companies that were able to manage their assets properly so that they could benefit from tax incentives and other tax concessions as a tax avoidance strategy. However, the higher the profitability, the higher the company's profit, the higher the tax that must be paid. Therefore, they will try to make efforts to avoid taxes to minimize the tax burden (Pratiwi, 2018).

The leverage control variable measured by the DAR proxy has a coefficient of -0.07 and a probability value of 0.016 on BTD. This means that leverage has a significant negative effect on the BTD proxy. This can be concluded because the higher the leverage ratio, the lower the tax avoidance practices in the firm. Aulia & Mahpudin (2020) stated that if profits decrease, it will decrease the tax burden on the firms, so they will be a lower tax aggressiveness because of the small tax burden.

Firm size, capital intensity, and Covid-19 variables are found to have no
significant relationship with tax avoidance practices. The probability value of these variables is above 0.05 with a coefficient value of 0.00; -0.04; and -0.00, respectively.

CONCLUSION
Tax avoidance is the practice of finding loopholes in tax regulations in order to reduce the company's tax burden. This decision is certainly made due to the weak control of stakeholders, especially shareholders. Therefore, the study aims to provide empirical evidence on how differences in ownership characteristics can affect tax avoidance. To achieve this goal, several ownership identities are selected that represent external and internal ownership with different opportunistic tendencies. These ownership identities include family ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and government ownership of non-financial firms in Indonesia during 2018-2022. Based on the test results, it can be concluded that the presence of family shareholders has a negative relationship with tax avoidance. Institutional, managerial, and government shareholders cannot prove their influence on tax avoidance. Through this research, it can also be proven that profitability and leverage have a significant effect on tax avoidance.

LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
The author found several limitations in conducting this research, it is hoped that these limitations can be used as suggestions for further research. This study uses the BTD proxy to measure tax avoidance by the sample companies because the proxy has been widely used in previous studies and can be used as a strong indicator for detecting tax avoidance. There are several other proxies to measure tax avoidance, such as the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) and Cash Effective Tax Rate (CETR). Each proxy is used for its purpose, where ETR focuses on calculating the tax burden, CETR calculates the amount of tax paid, and BTD sees the permanent difference between accounting profit and taxable income. Suggestions that can be given for future research are to use variants of tax avoidance measurement proxies to reduce research bias and are expected to be indicators and strong evidence of tax avoidance behavior.

The ownership identity characteristics in this study include family, institutional, managerial, and government. These types of characteristics have been able to describe the state of the company's shareholders. However, there are several other shareholder groupings, such as foreign, public, and other groupings. Suggestions for future research include using shareholder characteristics that were not used in this study to further determine the influence and relationship of each character on tax avoidance.

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